Price Frame, Obfuscation and Strategic Co-opetition
主讲人：郑捷教授（山东大学经济研究院）
主持人：王晓辉副教授（凯时AG登录入口副院长）
嘉宾介绍：张胜强教授（凯时AG登录入口副院长）
时间：2023年5月31日（周三）14:00-15:30
地点：辽宁大学蒲河校区校部办公楼317会议室
线上地点：腾讯会议 268-554-181；密码：5260
摘要：Two sellers with differentiated products compete and coordinate in a market by setting price frames first in Stage 1 and price levels later in Stage 2. A consumer's purchase decision depends not only on the difference of the net values, but also on the difference of the price frames. An increase in frame difference strengthens the obfuscation and yields two effects: the increase of market power and the equalization of market shares. The two effects are in the same direction for the weaker seller, while opposite for the stronger seller, which leads to the potential tension in the choice of price frame. We show that the former effect is dominated by the latter when the frame difference is small relative to the quality difference, and the former becomes dominant when the frame difference is relatively large. Therefore, the weaker seller's profit is monotone in frame difference, while the relationship exhibits a ``U''-shape pattern for the stronger seller. The equilibrium play is characterized. Our study contributes to the growing literature on price format, price dispersion, strategic obfuscation, and consumer protection.
郑捷，清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山东大学特聘教授，清华大学经济科学与政策实验室常务副主任。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优”评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。
